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Executive summary
In the next thirty years, Africa’s cities need to make room for 900 million 
more citizens – roughly tripling the current urban population.1 This offers new 
opportunities for growth and prosperity, as well as significant challenges for 
public policy. At their best, cities are engines for economic development and 
rising living standards, but at their worst, they become sites of congestion, 
overcrowding and discontent.
China is the only place in the world that has experienced a similarly 
monumental urban transition to the one currently being faced in Africa. 
Between 1978 and 2010, China’s urban areas took on approximately 700 
million additional people.2 It was in the cities where productivity growth drove 
the country’s thirty-year economic miracle.3 
A major difference is that Africa’s current urbanisation has not been associated 
with anywhere near the same gains in productivity and poverty reduction 
that have been seen in China. Instead, the growth of Africa’s cities has more 
often been associated with development challenges such as the rise of slums, 
unemployment, and political instability. With well-implemented and far-sighted 
public policy, this trend could be reversed and urbanisation could unlock a 
process of sustained and inclusive development in Africa. 
This paper provides a framework to understand the similarities and differences 
between Africa’s current urbanisation pathway and the path China has taken 
over the last 30 years.
We illuminate several areas for research that could be important for African 
policymakers to explore further, both to learn from China’s successes, as well 
as to avoid some of the challenges that are now being realised. This paper 
focus on the importance of sound policies around land use, infrastructure 
investment, urban governance, and industrialisation. In doing so, we highlight 
the unexploited potential of African cities.
1 Muggah, Robert. and Hill, Katie. “African cities will double in population by 2050. 
Here are 4 ways to make sure they thrive.” World Economic Forum online.  https://www.
weforum.org/agenda/2018/06/Africa-urbanisation-cities-double-population-2050-4%20
ways-thrive/ (retrieved May 15, 2019).
2 Fuzhan, Xie. Kuangdi, Xu. Fang, Cai. and Wu Zhiqiang. “On the road to quality 
urbanisation”. Telegraph online. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/china-watch/business/
urbanisation-in-china/ (retrieved May 15, 2019)
3 Yang, Li. "China’s Growth Miracle: Past, Present, and Future." United Nation Research 
Institute for Social Development 7 (2013).
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No country has developed without undergoing urban transition. It is often 
remarked as the necessary, albeit insufficient, condition for development. When 
urbanisation is successful, cities offer a platform for people and businesses to 
come together and generate new innovations that underpin economic growth. 
The density of cities also offers the prospect of improved liveability, as it is 
much cheaper and more efficient to provide people with public services and 
infrastructure when they are clustered together in close proximity. 
However, productive and liveable cities do not arise automatically. Without 
active public policy, a growing city will soon see the downsides of density, often 
epitomised by issues like gridlock traffic and mega-slums. These issues not only 
undermine liveability, but they constrain productive potential if firms become 
unwilling to invest and generate the jobs and incomes that ultimately fuel long 
term development. 
Figure 1 demonstrates these ideas by depicting the relationship between the 
urbanisation rate in 2010 and income per capita across countries. Globally, 
there is a clear positive relationship between the two measures: higher 
urbanisation rates are associated with rising incomes across all countries. 
However, there is also a notable distinction among several African countries 
compared to what has been seen in China and other places: many African 
countries are reaching high rates of urbanisation without achieving similar 
gains in income.
Without active public 
policy, a growing 
city will soon see the 
downsides of density 
such as gridlock traffic 
and slum housing.
Figure 1: Relationship between the urbanisation rate (%) in 2010 and log 
GDP per capita (PPP, constant 2010$) for a sample of 116 countries
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A major reason for these diverging performances, is that urbanisation in Africa 
has so far not gone hand-in-hand with large-scale and productive job creation. 
This was the bedrock of China’s growth: when people moved to cities, there 
were employment opportunities that allowed surplus labour from agriculture to 
be shifted into higher-value industries. By contrast, Africa is urbanising without 
significant industrialisation. Migrants are moving towards cities, not as a result 
of rising urban productivity, but rather to break away from rural poverty.4 
A key question for African policymakers is why African cities have not 
succeeded in generating rising incomes and what can be done about it. In this 
paper, we choose four areas that provide interesting comparisons with the 
Chinese experience, namely:
1 Clear systems for land ownership and proactive planning to ensure the 
efficient and intensive development of urban land; 
2 Pro-active investment in infrastructure and services to meet the needs of 
citizens and to mitigate issues such as congestion, crime and contagious 
disease;
3 Empowering local governments to raise finances and to pursue large-
scale, targeted investments needed to improve liveability; 
4 Ensuring physical connectivity and an overall enabling environment for 
firm growth and investment.
Differing approaches in these four areas between Chinese and many African 
cities will be further explored in this paper. However, it should be noted from 
the outset that the scale of change in China is not only wholly unprecedented 
for one single country, but the contextual differences in terms of economic, 
geographic, historical and institutional make-up are vast. In many cases, it 
may be unfeasible and undesirable for any African country to emulate the 
policies that guided urbanisation in China. No single approach would ever be 
suitable for a continent as diverse as Africa anyway, so with that in mind, this 
paper makes no attempt to be exhaustive. Our focus is on the forward-looking 
challenges African cities will face, and where the choices taken by China could 
be deemed informative for those looking to define their own models for urban 
growth. 
The rest of this paper discusses how certain urban policies can effectively 
contribute to the creation of more jobs and better living conditions. In the 
next sections, we first provide a brief overview of how cities can be engines 
of job creation and productivity growth. We then cover key areas to ensure 
cities are both liveable and productive – namely, land use and urban planning, 
infrastructure and services, urban governance, and firm growth.
4 Collier, Paul. "African Urbanisation: An Analytical Policy Guide." Policy paper, 
International Growth Centre, London (2016).
When people moved 
to Chinese cities, there 
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The co-evolution of urbanisation 
and job creation
People are typically drawn to cities for the prospect of a larger number of 
available as well as more diverse job opportunities. At the same time, firms 
choose to locate in cities because they stand to gain from close access to 
markets, as well as learning from neighbouring businesses.5 These productivity 
benefits are often termed agglomeration economies and they are reflected by 
urban-rural income differences – another draw to city life.6 The process of 
economic development is hence intrinsically linked to rural-urban migration, as 
individuals move away from rural agriculture and towards higher-value jobs in 
cities.7  
This is clearly reflected in the development experience of China, where 
urbanisation and rapid economic modernisation went hand-in-hand. Forty 
years ago, roughly 80 percent of the population was employed in rural 
agriculture;8 whereas today, nearly 60 percent of Chinese people live and work 
in urban areas.  China has become the home of several of the largest and world-
leading cities. This growth of cities was bolstered by massive industrialisation 
and economic growth: between 1978-2009, China’s aggregate GDP grew 
around 10% annually,9 effectively doubling national income every seven years.10 
Market-based reforms provided the initial impetus for China’s demographic 
shift towards cities: increasing productivity in agriculture created surplus 
workers and allowed huge portions of the agricultural labour force to move 
5 Combes, Pierre-Philippe, and Laurent Gobillon. "The empirics of agglomeration 
economies." In Handbook of regional and urban economics, vol. 5, pp. 247-348. Elsevier, 
2015.
6 D'Costa, Sabine, and Henry G. Overman. "The urban wage growth premium: Sorting or 
learning?". Regional Science and Urban Economics 48 (2014): 168-179.
7 Rosenstein-Rodan, Paul N. "Problems of industrialisation of eastern and south-eastern 
Europe." The economic journal 53, no. 210/211 (1943): 202-211. Nurkse, Ragnar. Problems 
of capital formation in underveloped countries. Oxford University Press, 1953. Lewis, 
W. Arthur. "Economic development with unlimited supplies of labour." The manchester 
school 22, no. 2 (1954): 139-191. Rostow, Walt Whitman. The process of economic growth. 
No. HB199 R65 1960. 1960.
8 U.N Habitat. "The state of African cities." Nairobi: The United Nations Settlements 
Programme (2010): 1-44.
9 Hu, Angang. China in 2020: A new type of superpower. Brookings Institution Press, 
2011.
10 Liu, Zheng. "Is China’s growth miracle over?" FRBSF Economic Letter 26, no. 10 
(2015).
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rural-urban migration.
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out of farming.11 At the same time, the state gave increasing support to 
privatisation, shifting away from centrally planned resource allocation and 
allowing the gradual liberalisation of economic markets and growth of the non-
state sector.12 These reforms gave rise to China’s progressive industrialization 
and urbanisation process. In the initial early stages, the government focused 
on the development of townships, and within just six years after ‘reform and 
opening up’, almost 50 million workers had relocated out of agriculture in 
favour of industrial areas in townships and villages.13
Later reforms attached greater importance to cities and the development of 
urban clusters and metropolitan circles. Reforms during this stage included 
those in the urban sector, further discussed in this paper, as well as the overall 
opening up of trade. These reforms encouraged workers from the rural and 
Township and Village Enterprise economies to move towards increasingly 
competitive cities. Importantly, these cities had the necessary mix of supportive 
infrastructure and institutions to encourage firms to grow and generate decent 
jobs that could absorb the large-scale transfer of the surplus rural labour force. 
The number of migrant workers increased rapidly during this period as China 
adopted a pro-urban industrial strategy that could take advantage of low-cost 
surplus labour. In just three decades, nearly 300 million rural migrants moved 
to Chinese cities. By 2007, private enterprises accounted for 51 percent of urban 
employment in China’s manufacturing sector and the country was positioned as 
a global leader in international trade.14 Today, the three largest cities in China 
occupy only 5% of land but are responsible for 40% of GDP.15
One thing Africa clearly has in common with post-1978 China, is that vast 
numbers of people are moving out of rural agriculture and towards cities. Some 
of the migration from rural areas to cities can be explained by the need to 
11 Under the collective farming system in China, large communes would work together 
and sell their outputs to the state. Decollectivization happened through the transfer to the 
household responsibility system in which households could directly sell their produce in the 
open market, after they had met a certain quota to be sold to the state. This shift to a more 
market-based system meant that agricultural prices began to rise, which in turn offered 
higher returns to investing in agricultural technologies. As a result, between 1978-2007, 
agricultural total factor productivity (TFP) grew on average by 4.01% per annum. See: 
Zhu, Xiaodong. "Understanding China's growth: Past, present, and future." Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 26, no. 4 (2012): 103-24.
12 Before 1978, China’s industrial production was largely governed by centrally planned 
resource allocation; the private industrial sector consisted of just a few collective firms that 
were confined to producing only a small number of consumer goods and neighbourhood 
services. However, with the reforms which included the introduction of the dual-track 
pricing system, State-Owned Enterprises were allowed to buy and sell surplus goods at 
market prices, after first meeting a certain quota of transactions at official government 
prices. Furthermore, non-SOEs were allowed to enter industries that were previously closed 
off to them.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Yeh, A. 2019 “From Mega-Cities to Mega-City Regions in China in a New Wave 
of Urbanisation and Economic Transition: Issues and Challenges.” Presentation at the 
International Conference on China Urban Development: Paradigm Shift to Quality 
Urbanisation. Beijing
The three largest cities 
in China occupy only 
5%of land but are 
responsible for 40% of 
GDP.
8 — CITIES THAT WORK
escape volatile and very poor rural environments.16 Other explanations include 
the fact that within Africa, the more urbanised countries tend to be those with 
large endowments of natural resources. It is argued that this occurs because 
resource income spending raises demand for urban goods and services, some of 
which can be imported and some of which can only be provided locally. This 
spending, therefore, drives a movement towards so-called ‘consumption cities’ 
where employment is local in scope rather highly productive and internationally 
competitive.17
However, as already noted, unlike China, Africa has been urbanising without 
major increases in agricultural or industrial productivity. Therefore, a crucial 
policy question to compare with the Chinese experience, is what people do 
when they get to cities: what kind of jobs do they have access to, and to what 
extent do these jobs support decent livelihoods and further economic growth. 
Recent work suggests that African cities have a much greater prevalence of 
primary employment, such as in agricultural services, than in other regions 
across the world and a much diminished role for manufacturing and service 
industries.18 This is true even amongst the largest urban areas, which generally 
tend to specialise in highly valued industries – such as finance and insurance 
– as manufacturing moves to smaller cities in response to rising urban land 
values.19 
Some of the policies underpinning 
successful cities
Making the most of urban land
Many African cities are characterized by urban sprawl, rather than 
densification. Affordable housing near the central city is generally lacking, so 
the market response is for households to either crowd together in slum-like 
conditions to be near jobs in the centre, or to be side-lined to the outskirts of 
cities where it is easier and more affordable to build. These issues will only be 
exacerbated with future population pressures. As a result, many of these cities 
are spatially dispersed and, without commensurate investments in transport, 
they lack connectivity, meaning they leave citizens isolated from social and 
economic life. 
16 Jedwab, R., Christiaensen, L. and Gindelsky, M., 2015. Demography, urbanization and 
development: Rural push, urban pull and… urban push? The World Bank.
17 Gollin, Douglas, Remi Jedwab, and Dietrich Vollrath. "Urbanisation with and without 
industrialization." Journal of Economic Growth 21, no. 1 (2016): 35-70.
18 Henderson, J. Vernon, and Sebastian Kriticos. "The development of the african system of 
cities." Annual Review of Economics 10 (2018): 287-314.
19 Ibid.
The important policy 
question is what 
people do when they 
get to African cities: 
what kind of jobs 
can they access and 
to what extent do 
they support better 
livelihoods?
9 — CAN AFRICA LEARN FROM THE CHINESE URBANISATION STORY?
According to recent research on 265 cities across 70 different countries, the 
average African city is 20% more fragmented than cities in Asia, 29% more 
expensive, and with 37% less exposure to people and jobs.20 Low exposure 
means that people are less able to connect and interact with other citizens, 
while fragmentation means that within a specified area, population density 
varies widely and inconsistently, limiting the potential productivity gains of 
clustering. The combination of low exposure and high fragmentation increases 
infrastructure and travel costs, limiting the productive potential of cities, 
businesses and individuals to grow.21
To meet future demands for urban growth, policy will need to encourage the 
intensive and efficient development of land. There are three key areas for public 
policy to support unleashing the full potential of urban land: 
1 Clarifying ownership. Clear and well-administered land ownership is 
critical for the efficient functioning of real estate markets - allowing land 
to be bought, sold, developed, and coordinated according to the needs of 
urban growth. 
2 Realistic and proactive urban planning. With effective planning, land 
is more likely to be developed in an orderly manner. This helps to 
coordinate expectations and influence the direction of future investments. 
It also helps to ensure that sufficient land can be reserved for essential 
infrastructures, such as roads, sewerage and safe water. Evidence has 
shown that trying to retrofit this infrastructure after people have settled 
can be up to three times more expensive.22
3 Enabling land and building use regulations. Restrictions on land use 
and building heights are sometimes necessary to ensure adherence to 
standards and the development of quality of infrastructure. However, 
when they are unrealistic and unenforceable, the restrictions can 
impair both liveability and productivity, hence incentivising increased 
informality, for example, in the form of slums.
In each of these cases, it is instructive to further examine the Chinese experience 
to understand how these policy areas were tackled. 
Clarifying ownership over land 
By 1978, almost all of China’s land, both urban and rural, was either owned by 
the state or by collectives. Private property rights were virtually non-existent 
and land transactions were prohibited. In recognition that land is a fundamental 
cornerstone to unleashing the potential of cities, the government has since 
undertaken gradual but significant reforms to land ownership. 
20 Lall, Somik Vinay, J. Vernon Henderson, and Anthony J. Venables. Africa's cities: 
Opening doors to the world. The World Bank, 2017. 
21 Ibid.
22 Fernandes, Edesio. Regularization of informal settlements in Latin America. Cambridge, 
MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2011.
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One of the early and influential reforms was the amendment of the 1988 
Constitution. The amendment split ownership and use-rights, by officially 
adopting land-leasing as the basis for assigning use rights to urban dwellers. 
This meant that the government continued to own the land, but the use rights 
could be bought for a specified period of time (typically between 40-70 years), 
through two types of public auction mechanisms, and then these rights could 
further be transacted in accordance with the law.23 The same system is still in 
effect today and it has been transformative to China’s urbanisation process.
There are other administrative laws which grant the local government powers 
over land use and expropriation. For instance, the 1998 Land Administration 
Law provides situations under which land use rights may be withdrawn for 
cases of public interest, although it should be noted that public interest is 
broadly interpreted, and it is commonplace for land to be withdrawn either 
to raise public revenue or to transfer property to private third-parties. If the 
right holder is entitled to compensation it is typically provided solely towards 
the structure sitting on the land, however, it may also include livelihood 
compensation if the structure or land is used for income-generating activities 
such as shops or farmland. Compensation is typically made either in cash 
(based on market prices) or in kind (in the form of a replacement structure), 
and accounts for any moving expenses or resettlement subsidies.
Several important advantages for urban management have arisen from China’s 
land reforms since 1978: although the system still does not provide full private 
property rights, there has been progress to improve security beyond the pre-
1978 system. Furthermore, having overarching state ownership of land has also 
meant that social and political conflicts have been reduced. In particular, it is 
clear that the government has the final claim to urban land and the principal 
way of recognising, recording and proving any other occupants over land 
was on the official government register. At the same time, however, land has 
increasingly been opened to market mechanisms that have enabled its dynamic 
and productive transfer. Lastly, the government has retained legal authority to 
enforce powers over land to ensure it is used for the public interest.  
Despite its advantages, China’s land system has also created many challenges 
related to the complexity of its administration. As land allocation and user 
fees are determined through an administrative, rather than competitive market 
process, land can be liable to be misused or unfairly priced. For instance, state-
owned enterprises have often been accused of subverting local government 
authority thanks to their direct connections with central ministries.24 It has 
also been argued that self-interested political groups often look to make short-
term gains from unfair land acquisition and transfer. This has contributed 
to an urbanisation model that heavily relies on the government’s ability to 
expropriate lands.
23 Ding, Chengri. and Knapp, Gerrit. 2003. “Urban land policy reform in China”. Lincoln 
Institute for Land Policy online. https://www.lincolninst.edu/publications/articles/urban-
land-policy-reform-china (retrieved, June 7, 2019).
24 You-Tien, H., 2010. The great urban transformation: Politics of land and property in 
China. Cary, NC: Oxford University Press.
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Evidence shows that only one-third of the total 163,000 hectares of state-
owned land that was sold in 2005 was done through “bidding, auction, and 
listing” – in other words, at market prices.25 According to new evidence, the 
auction systems themselves may have been subject to corruption.26 Since 2000, 
urban growth is also estimated to have encroached on farmland at a rate of 
0.04 hectares per urban resident.27  Between 1990 and 2010, it is estimated that 
local governments expropriated rural land around RMB 2 trillion below market 
value, to make way for peri-urban expansion.28 This undermining of individual 
land rights is clearly in direct contrast to the principles enshrined in Chinese 
laws. Unsurprisingly, this has led to public concern, according to surveying, 
around 65% of social unrest in China can be attributed to land disputes 
stemming from issues of illegal expropriation, inadequate compensation or 
forced land seizures.29 
Key lessons from the Chinese experience with relevance 
for Africa
Given China’s unique land tenure system, any lessons may be more relevant to 
African countries with largely publicly owned land and less relevant to those 
with land largely privately owned. It’s important to note that across Africa, 
there is great variation in terms of land tenure systems. In some cities like Addis 
Ababa, the government acts as the principal owner of urban land and the key 
promoter of redevelopment. In others like Nairobi and Kigali, land ownership 
has undergone large-scale transitions from customary to state-administered 
systems of private property ownership. Despite this, a common link across 
African cities, is that they grapple with overlapping systems of customary and 
formal tenure coupled with weak administration, often leaving institutional 
structures around land confusing and amorphous. One city that epitomises the 
challenges in land tenure is Kampala, Uganda (see Case Study 1).
Although the complexity of four concurrent tenure systems is very specific to 
Kampala, the situation of overlapping tenure and insecure land rights is one 
that is prevalent across African cities.30 This is one of the major reasons for 
urban sprawl and ineffective urban form as land is not used efficiently, given it 
cannot easily be transacted. Dysfunctional land markets then have numerous 
other implications, including discouraging private investment overall and 
25 Fewsmith, Joseph. "‘Social management’ as a way of coping with heightened social 
tensions." China Leadership Monitor 36, no. 6 (2012).
26 Li, M. 2019 “Information and Corruption: Evidence from China’s Land Market 
Auctions.” Presentation at the International Conference on China Urban Development: 
Paradigm Shift to Quality Urbanisation. Beijing
27 Woetzel, Jonathan, Lenny Mendonca, Janamitra Devan, Stefano Negri, Yangmel Hu, 
Luke Jordan, Xiujun Li, Alexander Maasry, Geoff Tsen, and Flora Yu. "Preparing for 
China’s urban billion." McKinsey Global Institute 1 (2009).
28 Page, Jeremy, and Brian Spegele. "Land dispute in China town sparks revolt." The Wall 
Street Journal (2011).
29 Göbel, Christian, and Lynette H. Ong. "Social unrest in China." Long Briefing, Europe 
China Research and Academic Network (ECRAN) (2012).
30 Ibid (19).
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hindering the emergence of effective land-based financing. We discuss these 
factors later in this paper.
CASE STUDY 1: THE COMPLEX OVERLAPPING LAND TENURE 
SYSTEMS OF UGANDA
Under the Constitution, land in Uganda is vested in the people.31 It 
further recognises the right of people to hold land under four different 
types of tenure systems, all of which exist in the city of Kampala today. 
As a direct result of this, Kampala has one of the most complex land 
tenure regimes of any city in the world.32 
These land tenures cover the two more conventional systems of 
freehold and leasehold. In addition, there is the third so-called “mailo” 
tenure system. This system is very specific to Uganda and traces its 
origins to colonial times. It incorporates 9000 square miles of land 
owned and managed by the Buganda Kingdom and it is structured with 
dual-ownership rights: meaning both the land owner and the owner of 
any permanent structures on the land have basically the same rights.33 
The fourth tenure system is customary tenure which incorporates land 
that is managed by specific tribes, outside the Buganda Kingdom. 
Each tribe in Uganda has their own customary rules and regulations on 
managing land. 
The resulting environment is one of very high tenure insecurity and 
poorly functioning land markets. It is estimated that about 95% of land 
owners across Uganda do not have officially registered titles, with 
similar figures for Kampala.34 To further these complexities, there is no 
complete database or system for land administration.
There are several important areas, beyond land use and allocation, where more 
learning from the Chinese experience could be useful. These include moving 
towards more straight-forward administrative areas, such as maintaining 
accurate and updated land registries, to more complex questions around 
land-tenure regularisation and improvements around legal and administrative 
systems. As the case study of Rwanda (see Case Study 2) shows in more detail, 
it is possible to make swift and effective improvements in these areas. Although 
when it comes to reforming tenure systems across the continent, Rwanda still 
remains the exception rather than the norm.
31 Government of Uganda. The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda. 1995
32 Mabikke, S. B. (2016) Historical Continuum of Land Rights in Uganda: A Review of 
Land Tenure Systems and Approaches for Improving Tenure Security, Journal of Land and 
Rural Studies 4(2), pp.153–171.
33 Ibid (29).
34 Ibid (30).
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CASE STUDY 2: RWANDA’S QUICK AND COST-EFFECTIVE 
APPROACH TO PARCEL IDENTIFICATION35 
Between 2009 and 2013, Rwanda became the first country in Africa 
to establish a comprehensive, up-to-date and fully digital property 
registry. Two aspects of the program are particularly notable: (i) the 
short time required from implementation to delivery – in just 5 years the 
government systematically demarcated and registered over 11 million 
parcels – and (ii) the low cost of registration at just $6 per parcel, well 
below international averages.
Before the parcel identification program, Rwanda was ranked 137th in 
the world for ease of property registration by the World Bank’s Doing 
Business Report; it is now ranked 4th. This shift makes Rwanda a much 
more attractive location for investment. Moreover, following formal land 
registration, land-related government revenues have increased over 
five-fold from approximately RwF 2bn ($3.3m) in 2011 to over RwF10bn 
($15m) in 2013.36 
Digitised parcel demarcation 
Source: adapted from Ngoga, H.T. (2018) Rwanda’s Land Tenure Reform: from non-
existent to best practice, CABI
35 Ngoga, Thierry Hoza. Rwanda’s land tenure reform: non-existent to best practice. 
CAB International, 2018.
36 Collier, P., Glaeser, E., Venables, T., Manwaring, P., & Blake, M. “Secure, legally 
enforceable and marketable land rights for urban development”. Final Report, IGC online: 
https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/land-rights-policy-framing-paper-
FINAL.pdf. (retrieved June 20, 2019).
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Realistic and proactive urban planning
Over the last half century, most Chinese cities were, in principle, supposed 
to have been constructed according to rigid master plans that set forth the 
economic functions of each city according to their population sizes, spatial 
development and consumption paths.37 Municipalities, under the central 
government, are meant to submit these plans for approval: each following the 
nation’s guidelines for protecting the ecosystem, consuming resources efficiently 
and promoting sustainable development and public welfare. However, in 
practice the majority of municipalities focus their master plans on land 
consumption needs, driven primarily by the need to raise own-source revenue, 
rather than enhancing city development and sustainability.38 Whilst this has 
provided some advantages in terms of China’s ability to meet the demands of 
rapid urbanisation, it has often come at the cost of sacrificing liveability. 
As we show in Case Study 3 of Shanghai below, some Chinese cities have made 
significant progress coordinating their urban planning efforts to ensure land is 
serviced with critical infrastructure in advance of settlement. This infrastructure, 
particularly transport infrastructure, has been used to actively shape locations 
and patterns of urban development.
CASE STUDY 3: URBAN REDEVELOPMENT IN SHANGHAI
Originally a small set of fishing villages, Shanghai is now estimated to 
be the largest city by population in the world. Now hosting around 23.5 
million people, the city’s population has doubled in size since 1987. 
Shanghai is home to one of the world’s most iconic financial centres and 
boasts some of China’s most prime real estate, including the world’s 
second tallest skyscraper – the 632-meter Shanghai Tower.
The growth of Shanghai can largely be attributed to massive 
redevelopment of the downtown area in the 1990s. With the new land-
leasing system in place, developers looked to make large profits from 
real estate investments, demolishing old dilapidated neighbourhoods 
and replacing them with modern towers.39 Many found Shanghai’s 
building growth unsettling, citing it as a real estate bubble.40 However, 
its record today is testament to the municipality’s capacity to anticipate 
the demand for urbanisation.
37 Song, Yan, and Xiaohong Pan. "Toward better plans to guide smart development in 
Chinese cities." Smart Urban Growth for China, Cambridge, Mass.: Lincoln Institute of 
Land Policy(2009): 193-214.
38 Ibid.
39 Amirtahmasebi, Rana, Mariana Orloff, Sameh Wahba, and Andrew 
Altman. Regenerating Urban Land: A Practitioner's Guide to Leveraging Private 
Investment. The World Bank, 2016.
40 Milton Friedman famously called Shanghai Pudong “a statist monument for a dead 
pharaoh on the level of the pyramids.” Mayor Xu Kuangdi responded to such criticisms by 
saying Pudong was like buying a suit a few sizes too big for a growing boy.
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Shanghai’s Pudong area. Now home to some of the world’s most 
expensive real estate, much of Pudong was marshland in the 1980s. 
Source: Getty Images/Jackson Pal
China’s land system has also incentivised in the rapid construction of real 
estate. In Figure 2, we show China’s residential real estate inventory by city 
type.41 Real estate inventory is measured by the ratio of floor space unsold to 
floor space sold during the period, with the ratio expressed in terms of years 
of overhang. According to the data, the inventory ratios across urban China 
has ranged from 0.4-4, meaning certain cities have had a surplus of property 
that could accommodate anywhere between four months to four years of 
urbanisation. This abundance of property has allowed China substantial room 
to accommodate large populations moving towards cities.
Rapid and large-scale housing investment has also been facilitated by high 
rates of savings adopted by Chinese households.42 High savings have meant 
that household investments could afford quality and residential height that 
supported density and improved urban planning. This is one major reason why 
China has urbanised without the creation of large slums as both individuals and 
the government had the savings to fund housing infrastructure. 
Large-scale construction has also contributed to challenges, many of which 
are now being felt as China’s urbanisation has slowed down. These challenges 
41 Chivakul, Mali, Mr Raphael W. Lam, Xiaoguang Liu, Wojciech Maliszewski, and Mr 
Alfred Schipke. Understanding residential real estate in China. No. 15-84. International 
Monetary Fund, 2015.
42 China’s household savings rates have often been noted as an international outlier (See 
Angang, 2012; or Prasad, 2009). Following the precarious economic and political situation 
prior to 1978, and the high growth rates experienced thereafter, it is argued that individuals 
saved most of their increases in income as opposed to spending it on consumption. 
According to the IMF, for the United States and other advanced economies, as well as 
emerging and developing countries, Gross Domestic Savings rates generally hover between 
20-30% of national GDP, whereas in China, gross savings rates have averaged around 40 
percent since 1980.
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include urban sprawl, ghost cities, and dormitory housing. In addition, there 
are growing concerns of Chinese property bubbles that could have large 
repercussions not only for the Chinese financial sector but for the global 
economy overall. There is now an increasing call for policy shifts towards 
regeneration of urban spaces that have been built already, such as is the case of 
Shanghai noted in Case Study 3, rather than co-opting more space for further 
real estate construction.
The urban Hukou system is another important, but often controversial, policy 
tool that was used to plan settlement into Chinese cities. Hukou is a system 
of household registration that determines where citizens can reside and what 
kind of access they have to public services such as pensions, healthcare, and 
education.43 There is great variation across regions in terms of the public 
services that are awarded to citizens of different Hukou groups: urban 
households have tended to have much greater benefits, while rural households 
have tended to be left behind. Even within cities, the system has made it difficult 
for people to improve their social status, as it is practically impossible to switch 
Hukou residency and gain better access to services even after moving to a new 
residence. In this sense, Hukou has been a tool to control migration into cities 
and to limit any social unrest arising as a consequence of over-migration.44 
The has resulted in wider inequalities that are now retroactively trying to be 
addressed. Relaxation of the Hukou system has recently become a common 
43 Fudla, Andreas. “Outdated ‘urban passports’ still rule the lives of China’s rural citizens. 
Independent online: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/outdated-urban-
passports-still-rule-the-lives-of-china-s-rural-citizens-a7517181.html. (retrieved June 24, 
2019)
44 Ibid. 
Figure 2: China’s residential real estate inventory ratio across difference 
regions between 2006 and 2013
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initiative for cities such as Guangzhou, Wuhan and Chongqing, in their efforts 
to attract more migrants.45 However, this too has come with its share of 
controversy as incumbent residents fear the threat of lower-quality services if 
resources are increasingly going to be spread across more people.46 
Key lessons from the Chinese experience with relevance 
for African cities
Many developing cities are wary of the influx of people they expect to face 
in the coming decades, often imposing restrictions on migration and land use 
as an attempt to curb their growth. However, the Hukou system shows that 
restriction on within-country migration can lead to very undesirable outcomes. 
Likewise, recent research shows that planning policies to restrict building 
development typically have little effect on preventing urban sprawl – instead 
they can engender other downsides such as higher rents in the city centres.47 
These poor planning decisions can be extremely costly and long lasting as 
shown in Case Study 4 of Nairobi.48 This is a result of two features. Firstly, it is 
expensive to provide infrastructure and services if places have been allowed to 
sprawl over large areas. Secondly, retrofitting infrastructure after settlement can 
be much more costly, both financially and in terms of disruption.
CASE STUDY 4: THE CONSEQUENCES OF POOR PLANNING IN 
NAIROBI
Nairobi has often been touted by leaders in Africa for its potential to 
be one of the continent’s economic powerhouses and a “world-class 
city region.”49 However, poor planning policies and perennial issues 
around land systems have meant Nairobi has actually seen rapidly rising 
inequalities.
45 Sheehan, Spencer. “China’s Hukou reforms and the urbanisation challenge. The diplomat 
online: https://thediplomat.com/2017/02/chinas-hukou-reforms-and-the-urbanisation-
challenge/. (retrieved June 24, 2019). 
46 Lu, Rachel. “China is ending its ‘apartheid.’ Here’s why no one is happy about it. Foreign 
policy online: https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/07/31/china-is-ending-its-apartheid-heres-
why-no-one-is-happy-about-it/. (retrieved June 24, 2019).
47 Angel, Shlomo, Alejandro M. Blei, Jason Parent, Patrick Lamson-Hall, N. Galarza-
Sanchez, Daniel L. Civco, and K. Thom. "Atlas of urban expansion—2016 edition." Areas 
and densities. Cambridge, MA: NYU Urban Expansion Program at New York University, 
UN-Habitat, and the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy (2016).
48 Baruah, Neeraj G., J. Vernon Henderson, and Cong Peng. "Colonial legacies: shaping 
African cities." (2017).
49 Myers, Garth. "A world-class city-region? Envisioning the Nairobi of 2030." American 
Behavioral Scientist 59, no. 3 (2015): 328-346.
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Roughly 60 percent of households live in informal slum-like conditions, 
as defined under the Millennium Development Goals.50 The complex 
history of land ownership coupled with weaknesses in urban planning 
have been major contributors to this widespread informality. Unrealistic 
restrictions on building and land use push much of the city to informality 
and discourage private sector investment in affordable formal housing. 
For instance, the minimum legal plot size for formal households is one-
sixteenth of an acre, which is completely unaffordable for the average 
household.51 Furthermore, it is estimated that only 2 percent of formally 
constructed houses are targeted to the lower income segments of the 
market, although they account for the largest share of demand.52
These weaknesses in urban management have led to the proliferation 
of slums in Nairobi. This includes Kibera, the largest slum on the African 
continent. One current estimate puts the cost of land misallocation in 
Kibera at over $1 billion; thus, the market value of titled land would in 
theory be high enough for each landlord to be compensated at the value 
of all their future rents, and each tenant household to be compensated 
with £16,000 (roughly 25 years’ worth of rent payments).53
Kibera slum occupies a 3km2 area in central Nairobi. It is Africa’s 
largest informal settlement. A combination of poor planning 
policies and weaknesses in land institutions have contributed to its 
proliferation. 
Source: Getty images.
50 The World Bank Group. “Kenya urbanisation review.” 2016. Accessed online: http://
documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/639231468043512906/pdf/AUS8099-WP-P148360-
PUBLIC-KE-Urbanisation-ACS.pdf. (retrieved July 12, 2019).
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid.
53 Henderson, J. Vernon, Tanner Regan, and Anthony J. Venables. "Building the city: sunk 
capital, sequencing, and institutional frictions." (2016).
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It seems that one major lesson from China’s experience is that rather than 
restricting the movement of people, proactively planning for their arrival is 
a route that can have more desirable outcomes. This is underpinned by some 
evidence from Africa suggesting that settlements emerging in areas that were 
planned better from the outset are also likely to stay that way in years to come. 
For example, research on slum upgrading and sites and services projects in 
Tanzania shows that areas that received critical infrastructure in advance of 
settlement ended up being better planned and better serviced even 30 years 
later.54 The improved planning subsequently resulted in land values on average 
five times higher than other areas that received the same amount of investment 
in the form of retrospective slum upgrading, but did not have planning in 
advance of settlement.
Having a better understanding of the Chinese planning experience, both in 
terms of opportunities and pitfalls, could be useful for some African cities. It 
is important that cities take on proactive and realistic plans that account for 
local government capacity and incentives. Once cities have an effective arterial 
road and infrastructure system in place, it is much more likely that a formal 
real estate market can flourish. Here, the government has a key role to play in 
providing the core infrastructure that enables growth to occur in a structured 
and planned manner from the outset. An example of how this can be done 
cheaply and efficiently is outlined in Case Study 5, although this is only starting 
to be explored and examples of such initiatives are limited across the continent. 
CASE STUDY 5: MAKING ROOM FOR URBAN EXPANSION IN 
ETHIOPIA55
The Ethiopian government has partnered with New York University’s 
Marron Institute to advocate a new model of urban planning. It focuses 
on making room for a growing city, but at the same time deeply 
involves the community. This approach aims to build the platform upon 
which cities can accommodate expected growth through three basic 
principles: (i) allowing cities to grow with requisite land for expansion, 
(ii) ensuring land is planned and serviced with core infrastructure, and 
(iii) securing the rights for their use.
Initial results show that these new, simple and cost-effective plans have 
allowed for the creation of arterial roads and public spaces, bringing the 
available land supply in line with projected growth. Importantly, given 
that the plans were undertaken with the communities’ involvement, they 
are more widely accepted and therefore have a higher likelihood of 
being followed. An additional benefit of this type of planning is that local 
governments have been strengthened and a new university has trained 
hundreds of urban planners.
54 Michaels, Guy, Dzhamilya Nigmatulina, Ferdinand Rauch, Tanner Regan, Neeraj 
Baruah, and Amanda Dahlstrand-Rudin. "Planning ahead for better neighborhoods: long 
run evidence from Tanzania." (2017).
55 Ibid.
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However, city planning in the Ethiopian context, like with many African 
countries, has been challenging. For example, the advent of the Addis 
Ababa master plan previously led to widespread discontent by the 
Oromo ethnic group because large tracts of land, especially those used 
for agriculture, were to be transferred into the municipality and used for 
housing or industry. This led to widespread riots, which heavily affected 
national planning.
Finally, investments in infrastructure and future service provision should also 
proactively consider questions concerning the equality and vulnerabilities of 
different residents in the city. Addressing this from the outset can thus help 
avert the high levels inequality currently observed in many Chinese cities.
Supportive land and building use regulations
Land use regulations and building standards have significant effects on urban 
form.56 A well-regulated real estate sector should operate within the boundaries 
of appropriate safety standards and land use requirements, without significant 
distortions to housing supply and affordability. However, excessive regulation 
can price residents out of the housing market, side-lining them to informality. 
Public policy has to make astute choices based on available resources in order 
to balance these priorities between housing to meet basic needs versus housing 
to satisfy certain standards. 
In China, the government has a strong influence on the real estate sector. 
Although, private entities play a significant role in real estate development 
thanks to land-leasing, this is done in practice through close public guidance. 
Like many countries, this regulation is in the form of land use restrictions to 
control urban development, such as maximum floor-area ratios.57 Research on 
30 major Chinese cities shows that such regulations often impose restrictive 
constraints, which are also difficult to enforce.58 As such, developers often 
fail to comply with the system by building floor area above the regulatory 
limits.59 Unrealistic restrictions are also an avenue for corruption and it has 
been noted that particularly firms with close-ties to the government are often 
the most persistent violators of land-use regulation. At the same time, evidence 
also suggests that regulatory FAR limits in urban China are much lower than 
the FAR levels that would maximize land value, especially for land parcels in 
relatively more attractive locations.60 
56 Bertaud, A., 2018. Order without design: how markets shape cities. MIT Press.
57 Glaeser, Edward, Wei Huang, Yueran Ma, and Andrei Shleifer. "A real estate boom with 
Chinese characteristics." Journal of Economic Perspectives 31, no. 1 (2017): 93-116.
58 Cai, Hongbin, Zhi Wang, and Qinghua Zhang. "To build above the limit? 
Implementation of land use regulations in urban China." Journal of Urban Economics 98 
(2017): 223-233.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
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Key lessons from the Chinese experience with relevance 
for African cities
The sufficient provision of affordable housing is a major challenge across 
African cities – both for the residents who have already settled as well as for 
the future residents to come. Large-scale formal investment in low-cost housing 
is currently not underway, typically households live in low-cost shacks that 
do not comply with regulatory standards, have informal occupancy rights, 
and poor infrastructure. These issues relate to the policy challenges that we 
have so far highlighted. Unclear ownership systems that lock land markets in. 
Inefficient regulations which price low-income households out of the market 
and disincentivise formal private construction. The lack of planning ahead of 
settlement to ensure provision of housing either directly by the government or 
by the private sector based on foundational public infrastructure. 
Some countries like Ethiopia (see Case Study 6) have attempted to respond to 
the housing challenge through the provision of large-scale public social housing. 
However, most African governments cannot afford to finance such large-scale 
social housing provision and many similar projects have failed. An exemplary 
case is in Luanda, Angola, where a $3.5 billion social housing project developed 
on the outskirts of the capital, resulted in unit prices far above what low-
income residents could realistically afford: apartments had a starting price of 
$120,000 in a country where per capita incomes are just over $4,000.61 An 
additional problem for the provision of large-scale housing, as highlighted by 
the Ethiopian case, is its frequent location on the outskirts of cities. Without 
commensurate investments in transportation, these areas become inaccessible. 
It is often the case that the people who have been rehoused in the outskirts then 
decide to move back to more conveniently located slums, thus not resolving the 
problems of affordable housing and informal settlements.62 
One area where China’s experience may be instructive is how to stimulate 
the private real estate market.  Here, the regulatory environment will play a 
key role. While African and Chinese cities have had their own challenges with 
regards to regulations, the nature of these challenges, and its consequences, 
are very different. In particular, many African cities have inherited their 
housing systems and associated regulations from colonial times, which impose 
unrealistic standards, such as on wall thickness, room size, foundation depth 
and minimum plot size. Unlike the Chinese situation, where property developers 
seek to build above and beyond the low threshold density restrictions, in 
many African cities, the state imposes high standards for formal property 
development which are extremely difficult to meet without significantly raising 
property prices. In Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, the minimum housing lot size is 
375m2, as compared to 30m2 in Philadelphia, a city in the US where average 
61 Collier, Paul., Glaeser, Edward., Venables, Anthony., Manwaring, Priya., and Blake, 
Michael. “Policy options for informal settlements”. Final Report, IGC online: https://
www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/informal-settlements-policy-framing-paper-
March-2019.pdf
62 Collier, Paul., Glaeser, Edward., Venables, Anthony., Manwaring, Priya., and Blake, 
Michael. “Policy options for informal settlements”. Final Report, IGC online: https://
www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/informal-settlements-policy-framing-paper-
March-2019.pdf
In Luanda, Angola, 
a $3.5 billion social 
housing project 
resulted in apartments 
which had a starting 
price of $120,000 
despite per capita 
incomes being just 
over $4,000.
22 — CITIES THAT WORK
incomes are far higher. Given that these regulations are wholly unrealistic, they 
are also unenforceable: in the described case of Dar es Salaam, an estimated 
90% of the city fails to comply with the imposed standards.63 This is what leads 
to the emergence of informal housing and stymies the emergence of large-scale 
formal housing. 
While restrictions can be important for maintaining the quality of the urban 
fabric as well as promoting aspects such as safety, it is critical that building 
standards reflect the needs of the city. This can help ensure that the costs of 
compliance do not impair urban growth or push citizens into informality. Some 
level of non-compliance is likely inevitable, but it is reduced when the benefits 
of non-compliance are low and the costs high. This is an area that can further 
be explored, particularly how to ensure there is enough housing for settlement 
at the same time avoiding the pitfalls that China has experienced with its 
housing market, as there are urgent needs for further reform in Africa.
CASE STUDY 6: ADDIS ABABA’S INTEGRATED HOUSING AND 
DEVELOPMENT PLAN
More than two-thirds of citizens in Addis Ababa live with poor housing 
conditions such as over-crowded spaces, informal building materials, 
and a lack of access to clean water and sanitation.64 Current estimates 
suggest that the housing deficit could be as high as half a million units.65 
At the same time, the city population is expected to double in the next 
ten years to over 8 million. In the face of its growing urban population, 
the government has embarked on its ambitious Integrated Housing and 
Development Plan (IHDP).66
To date, the government-driven housing program has built and 
transferred over 200,000 flats to owner-occupiers via a lottery system.67 
The state plans and builds these apartments at large-scale, outsourcing 
construction to private firms and providing connective infrastructure 
such as roads, sewerage and water in return. Most of the housing is 
built on the city periphery where land and local wages are cheaper, 
helping to reduce program costs. This has allowed the program to be 
self-financed without any assistance from foreign donors. 
Many see the housing program as a rare success in Africa. Research 
shows that the beneficiaries see dramatic improvements in their 
housing quality as well as a much greater willingness to invest in their 
63 Ibid (19)
64 Franklin, Simon. "The demand for government housing: Evidence from lotteries for 
200,000 homes in Ethiopia." (2019).
65 Gardner, T. “‘Addis has run out of space’: Ethiopia’s radical redesign”. The Guardian 
online: https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2017/dec/04/addis-ababa-ethiopia-redesign-
housing-project (retrieved June 13, 2019).
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid (35).
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properties.68 In turn, the developments become vibrant economic 
spaces, generating new sources of income and employment. 
Furthermore, the program is heavily oversubscribed such that many 
show a strong willingness to move out of slums in favour of the 
condominiums. 
Others see the program as contentious, drawing the government 
deep into debt whilst still failing to provide housing that is affordable 
to the average citizen. Many that win the lottery later choose to rent 
the property in order to pay off the mortgage.69 Some never take up 
residence because the condominiums are too far away from jobs in 
the centre.70 Furthermore, transport investments have not kept at pace, 
so with many of the condominiums located on the outskirts of the city, 
some argue it causes social exclusion.
New condominium developments on the outskirts of Addis Ababa. 
Source: Charlie Rosser 
The critical role of infrastructure and public 
services
As cities grow, governments have to make major investments. Larger cities 
inherently require more effective provision of public services and infrastructure 
– such as housing, transport, energy, and water – so they can become places 
of rising living standards and productive industries. These public investments 
can coordinate and encourage other complementary investments taken on by 
households and firms. 
68 Ibid (35).
69 Ibid (35).
70 Ibid (35).
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The Chinese approach to infrastructure and public service 
investment
High fixed capital investments in industry and infrastructure were key to 
China’s early stage development and urban transition. In Figure 3, we use 
World Bank data to compare the rates of gross capital formation in China and 
Africa. Africa had roughly the same investment share of GDP as China did in 
1980; however, it has consistently seen a rising share of investment in GDP 
since, which has been coupled with rising income levels. Contrastingly, over the 
period, Africa’s share of investment in GDP has fallen, while GDP has roughly 
stagnated.
China’s higher investment levels have served to facilitate massive infrastructure 
programs undertaken over the last four decades. For instance, China did not 
have any high-speed rail in 1999, but by 2010 had 7,400 kilometres worth 
of track - the highest in the world.71 Road construction has been similar: by 
the end of 2010, China had 74,000 kilometres of highway, second only to the 
United States.72 China has also become the leading producer of electric power, 
surpassing the United States in 2011.
Although China has now become a world leader in renewable investments, its 
concern for the environmental consequences of rapid urbanisation is relatively 
recent. Hence, the its past investments and population growth has been coupled 
with increased environmental stress. For example, between 1980 and 2010 oil 
71 Ibid (35).
72 Ibid (8).
Figure 3: Gross capital formation (% of GDP) in China vs Sub-Saharan 
Africa 1980-2015
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and coal consumption in China doubled every twelve years and electricity usage 
doubled every five.73 Moreover, according to the World Bank, 16 of the 20 most 
polluted cities are in China;74 while Greenhouse Gas Emissions is said to be the 
third leading cause of death in Chinese cities.75 These environmental stresses 
extend to water: out of a survey of 198 cities in 2012, 57% of groundwater was 
rated either bad or extremely bad, whilst 40% of rivers were deemed seriously 
polluted.76 This will have further knock-on effects in the future as urban water 
demand is already outpacing supply by as much as 6 billion cubic meters per 
year.77 Although China has now adopted a model of “ecological civilisation” 
that is expected to move urbanisation forward in a more sustainable 
and resilient manner, some question whether this consideration has been 
incorporated too late.78
Key lessons from the Chinese experience with relevance 
for African cities
While infrastructure has improved dramatically across Africa over the last few 
decades, many cities still have major deficiencies. In transport, it is estimated 
that the density of paved roads in Sub-Saharan Africa is less than one quarter 
of other low-income regions.79 With unpredictable and unreliable roads, high 
transport costs lower firm productivity and competitiveness in trade.80 Power 
is another example, where Africa has around half the generating capacity per 
person compared to South Asia.81 Without reliable energy, large firms have 
to depend on their own back-up generators, while others struggle to operate 
without power.82 Furthermore, only 33 percent of urban households in Sub-
Saharan Africa has access to piped water on premises in 2015, compared to an 
average of 79 percent worldwide.83 
73 Ibid (42).
74 World Bank. Urban China: Toward efficient, inclusive, and sustainable urbanisation. 
World Bank, 2014.
75 Feigin, Valery L., Mohammad H. Forouzanfar, Rita Krishnamurthi, George A. Mensah, 
Myles Connor, Derrick A. Bennett, Andrew E. Moran et al. "Global Burden of Diseases, 
Injuries, and Risk Factors Study 2010 (GBD 2010) and the GBD Stroke Experts Group. 
Global and regional burden of stroke during 1990-2010: findings from the global burden of 
disease study 2010." Lancet 383, no. 9913 (2014): 245-54.
76 Ibid (59).
77 Ibid (42).
78 Wu, F. 2019 “Adding New Narratives to Urban Imagination: An Introduction to New 
Directions of Urban Studies in China.”
79 Vivien, Foster, and Cecilia Briceño-Garmendia. "Africa's Infrastructure: A Time for 
Transformation." In Foster, V. and C. Briceno-Garmendia (2010), Africa's Infrastructure: A 
Time for Transformation, Africa Development Forum, World Bank, Washington DC. 2010.
80 Donaldson, Dave, Amanda Jinhage, and Eric Verhoogen. "Beyond borders: Making 
transport work for African trade." IGC Growth Brief Series 9 (2017).
81 Collier, Paul, and Anthony J. Venables. "Urbanisation in developing economies: the 
assessment." Oxford Review of Economic Policy 33, no. 3 (2017): 355-372.
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An important aspect to further scrutinise the Chinese experience is how to 
plan for, finance and coordinate major infrastructure investments. In addition, 
given that much of the infrastructure investment currently happening in African 
cities is both being financed by the Chinese government and constructed 
by Chinese companies, this is an area where understanding China’s role in 
African urbanisation will also be key. Unlike the Chinese experience, it will be 
imperative that African countries understand how such large-scale investments 
can be made, incorporating considerations for the climate and the environment, 
to ensure sustainability and resilience for these investments from the outset.
Improving urban governance and municipal 
finance
Under conducive institutional structures in cities, firms grow and new 
businesses start up, creating thousands of new jobs annually. Productivity 
growth should then become a self-sustaining process: as employment increases, 
income and market size expand, more funds become available for public 
investments and firms achieve the scale and specialisation needed to make them 
competitive. All of these factors are required to ensure that cities work better to 
accelerate economic transformation, the pace of which, therefore, is dependent 
on the alignment of existing power structures.
The underpinning features of institutions can broadly be categorised into three 
groups: responsibility, capacity, and legitimacy:84
 — Responsibility: relates to who or which agency makes a given policy 
decision in a city. In essence, this captures how well decision-making 
authority is assigned and whether there are ambiguities due to 
overlapping mandates or complex chains of command. 
 — Capacity: reflects the competency of governing authorities to fulfil 
their mission statements or purposes based on their management and 
governance structures and their motivation for achieving results. This 
includes: (i) Human resources: number, skills, experience; (ii) Material/
physical resources: capital, assets; (iii) Financial resources: cash flow, 
credit, access to finance and ability to issue debt; (iv) information: 
knowledge, databases, advisory services; and (v) dedication to achieve 
objectives.
 — Legitimacy: reflects the right to rule of government which is often based 
on a common narrative of either development, institutional mandate, or 
descriptive representation. Citizens will rarely accept their government 
automatically, instead active public policies are required to ensure citizen 
engagement and a reputation of good performance by the government for 
its citizens. 
84 Haas, A.R.N, Wani, S. (2019). “Urban Governance Institutions: Policy Options for Fast 
Growing Cities” Version 1. IGC Cities that Work Policy Framing Paper. U.N. Habitat. 
“Urban Governance” UNH online: https://unhabitat.org/governance/ (retrieved June 3, 
2019). 
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Social learning and policy experimentation in the Chinese 
case
One of the successes of China’s development model and urban transition was 
the country’s capacity for policy learning at a local level. China’s development 
approach was rapid and innovative, but it was also flexible, as personified 
by the idea of “crossing the river by feeling the stones”. It was a recognition 
that coming out of the Mao era, where governing institutions were relatively 
underdeveloped, the potential repercussions of implementing grand, national-
level policies and getting them wrong were immense. Moreover, the sheer size 
of the country and its inherent regional variations, called for flexibility and a 
gradual, location specific outlook.85 
Crucially, these ideas meant local governments were effectively empowered 
in three ways: (i) learning by doing through experimenting with different 
development approaches; (ii) effective decentralisation of fiscal and 
administrative functions; and (iii) active incentives to carry out policies. This 
is not to deny that China still maintained a centrally-controlled state structure, 
however, the environment created could simultaneously facilitate ‘top-down’ 
central sponsorship of policies whilst also mobilising ‘bottom-up’ initiative 
through local experimentation.86 Local governments could pilot policies that 
were tailored to local development needs, whilst still being guided by a variety 
of state-level objectives.87
Another important element is the primacy assigned to economic performance 
in the career evaluation process for Chinese government officials.88 Each local 
government is evaluated through a performance system that rewards local 
leaders for their success against national development goals.89 Successful 
projects are then scaled-up nationally. This has led to harnessing of large parts 
of the local bureaucratic apparatus, with the goal of attracting investment, 
including agencies that would nominally not necessarily have an explicit 
economic focus.90 In combination with fiscal decentralisation, this institutional 
set-up gives local policymakers the means and incentives to promote local 
economic development. Furthermore, it supports the advent of a cycle in which 
increasing urban revenues allowed for additional infrastructure investment, 
generating further economic activity and ultimately further revenues. 
85 Florini, Ann M., Hairong Lai, and Yeling Tan. China experiments: From local 
innovations to national reform. Brookings Institution Press, 2012.
86 Heilmann, Sebastian. "Policy experimentation in China’s economic rise." Studies in 
Comparative International Development 43, no. 1 (2008): 1-26.
87 North (1990, 2005) and Naugton (2007), describes the institutional structure as enabling 
the government to test-out alternative approaches to overcome long-standing development 
challenges, tackle newly emerging challenges, and grasp opportunities when they open up.
88 This is why local policy experimentation has often been described as ‘‘smuggling 
in’’ incremental policy change in the absence of wholesale institutional transformation 
(Naughton 1995; Rawski 1999; Lin et al. 2003; Roland 2000; Ramo 2004; Xu 2011).
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Social learning and experimentation has led to some of the most important 
innovations in China’s urbanisation and industrialisation cycle. One example is 
the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Shenzhen, which epitomises the strengths 
of the Chinese model of urban planning coupled with local decentralisation 
and innovation. Shenzen is an interesting example to consider (see Case Study 
7), it is often regarded as one of the most innovative cities in China for public 
policy, both in terms of economic reforms as well as its role in promoting 
urban change.91 As one of the first ever SEZs piloted in China in the early 
1980s, Shenzhen was originally set-up to bypass issues of central planning 
and offer economic incentives to attract business investment. Among its 
important economic innovations were the implementation of contract labour 
and a non-fixed wage system, which brought the city huge efficiency gains via 
lower labour costs and the ability to attract the best qualified and motivated 
enterprises.92 Shenzhen was also the testing ground for some of China’s most 
important urban land reforms. Ultimately, this led to a highly productive city 
that spearheaded many aspects of the country’s economic transformation.93 
Although Shenzhen provided replicable individual innovations and was deemed 
an overall success, as we discuss later in the paper, three other SEZs launched at 
the same time were less successful. In this sense, experimentation was not only 
important for learning what worked and could be scaled, but also for helping 
policymakers identify failing policies.
CASE STUDY 7: LAND POLICY EXPERIMENTATION IN SHENZHEN
The first ever transaction of land use rights occurred in the Shenzhen 
Special Economic Zone (SEZ) on the 9th of September 1987, when the 
municipality sold user rights to a local company over a 50-year lease.94 
This was despite the fact that the 1982 constitution in effect at the time, 
which stated that ‘no organization or individual may appropriate, buy, 
sell, or lease land, or unlawfully transfer it in other ways’. Shenzhen 
modelled its land auction off the Hong Kong leasehold system.95 
Several more land transactions followed and these set a precedent for 
monumental changes in Chinese land use management.  Within one 
year, the national government amended the 1982 constitution in order 
to officially adopt the land-leasing practices of Shenzhen nationwide 
- paving the way for the substantial urban redevelopment and renewal 
that Chinese cities have since witnessed. 
91 Yueng et al (2013)
92 Ibid. 
93 Yeung, Yue-man, Joanna Lee, and Gordon Kee. "China's special economic zones at 
30." Eurasian Geography and Economics 50, no. 2 (2009): 222-240.
94 Zhu, Jieming. "Denationalization of urban physical development: The experiment in the 
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, China." Cities 13, no. 3 (1996): 187-194.
95 Ibid (84)
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As the first city to initiate land-leasing, Shenzhen also became one 
of the first recipients of large-scale commercial interests for real-
estate development. As noted, prior to this reform, national and local 
government had been the primary propagators of capital investment for 
urban redevelopment across China. However, Shenzhen’s land-leasing 
allowed the legitimate commercialisation of land, thus clearing the 
way for non-state sectors to undertake large-scale land and property 
related investments within a more market-based system and therefore 
reconfiguring the state’s role as a regulator of physical development 
rather than being the dominant player.96 Between 1980 and 1990, the 
proportion of capital construction investment in Shenzhen Municipality 
from both central and local government fell from 34.1 percent to 11.7. At 
the same time, annual investment inflows grew almost forty-fold, from 
an initial 125 million yuan (~80m USD) in 1980 to 5 billion yuan (~ 1.05bn 
USD) by 1990.
Property developments at Shenzhen harbour
Source: Pixabay Izq19840715
Across China, many other municipalities adopted this culture of policy 
experimentation and often the central government played an important role 
in guiding the process. In some cases, the central government has actually 
instigated urban policy experiments itself, such as several incremental urban 
housing reforms in the late 1980s and 1990s.97 In these cases, the central 
government chose the pilot experiments, the cities to host them, and ultimately 
whether they were replicated nationally. This discovery of housing policies 
through experimentation has since had an important impact on the way 
housing is produced and consumed in Chinese cities.98
96 Ibid (85)
97 Mei, Ciqi, and Zhilin Liu. "Experiment-based policy making or conscious policy design? 
The case of urban housing reform in China." Policy Sciences 47, no. 3 (2014): 321-337.
98 Ibid. 
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However, despite the notable achievements of local experimentation in cities 
such as Shenzhen, it has not been without its shortcomings. For example, 
competition between different regions has occasionally led to redundant 
infrastructures, as competing local governments duplicate efforts to attract 
investments. Competition has also disincentivised the cooperation between 
different provincial and municipal governments, as local officials prioritise 
the achievements of results with their own resources, rather than developing 
complementarities with other local governments.99 Lastly, some commentators 
point to the incompatibility between economic imperatives, sustainable 
development, and the orderly spatial organisation of cities, particularly if 
officials allow investors to subvert the directives of spatial planning.100
Local government’s ability to capture land values for 
revenue
The move towards a land leasing system provided local governments in China 
a crucial source of revenue with which they could finance investments in their 
cities. Local governments were able to tap into appreciating land values in 
cities and take control over how these public resources were spent. This process 
facilitated a cycle in which publicly generated increases in land values, which 
arose over the course of the urbanisation process, could be captured by the 
local government and re-invested in cities to ensure they had adequate resources 
to support their growing needs. Given the rapid rates of urbanisation in Africa 
to date, this is one financing tool that is currently being explored by local 
governments. Here it may be instructive to learn from China’s experience as it 
is deemed to be one of the most successful examples of land-based financing to 
date. 
While the Chinese system of land-leasing has brought significant resources to 
subnational governments, it is also important to note the downsides. Some 
observers argue it is over-reliant on urban expansion, which has contributed 
to sprawling cities, whilst also progressively challenging local governments’ 
ability to avail land for auction, particularly as lease-terms have now been 
extended to 40-70 years.101 One must also consider how municipal finance fits 
into the broader context of China’s national governance and fiscal framework. 
Uneven decentralisation of the fiscal system has engendered many regional 
disparities in the per-capita tax base which are typically not allayed by national 
fiscal transfers. With large gaps between expenditure responsibilities and fiscal 
resources, many subnational governments have had to take on large debts or 
use illicit approaches to raise revenues. 
Increased local autonomy has also had its downsides. For example, political 
elites have often been accused of abusing the auction system, pursuing policies 
99 Leaf, Michael. "Urban planning and urban reality under Chinese economic 
reforms." Journal of Planning Education and Research 18, no. 2 (1998): 145-153.
100 Wei, Yehua Dennis. "Planning Chinese cities: The limits of transitional 
institutions." Urban Geography 26, no. 3 (2005): 200-221.
101 Yang, T. 2019. “A New Model for Land Value Capture in Planned New Urban Centres: 
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in their own self-interest above the prosperity of their jurisdictions as a whole.102 
For instance, it is argued that competition between local governments for 
achieving rapid economic growth has often provided incentives for bureaucrats 
to avoid making better use of underused urban land.103 Instead, municipalities 
are able to generate huge revenues through cheap land requisition in the areas 
surrounding their cities, and subsequent selling of user rights to industrial 
activity. This contributes to issues of unfair land acquisition and urban 
expansion mentioned previously.104 Another concern is that local officials have 
often emphasised land allocation to capital-intensive manufacturing above the 
service industry, potentially limiting the benefits of high urban density - which 
are argued to be more relevant to the service sector.105 According to the World 
Bank, China devotes around a quarter of urban land to manufacturing, whereas 
cities like Hong Kong and Seoul devote only 5 and 7 percent respectively.106 
Key lessons from the Chinese experience with relevance 
for African cities
It cannot be emphasised enough that Africa is a large and extremely diverse 
continent. Hence, each African country, and in fact city, will need to work on 
identifying their own specific solutions and then to target policy approaches 
and resources around those. What is important to understand from the Chinese 
experience is how to encourage policy learning and subsequent scale-up 
through empowering and incentivising local government. It’s also be important 
to take heed on how to ensure local officials can be incentivised to experiment 
in ways that maximise public benefit, rather than private gain. Once policy 
experimentation is deemed successful, the Chinese experience may also provide 
insights on how to scale these up from a local to a more national level. 
From a municipal financing perspective, there are challenges to fully emulating 
the Chinese model elsewhere, and particularly in Africa as a result of the 
complexity of their tenure systems. The Chinese model of land-based financing 
requires the tight administration and public ownership of land that the Chinese 
government has. Many African countries would have to undertake reforms of 
their land systems first, before they are able to undertake similar land-based 
financing. 
102 Li, M. 2019 “Information and Corruption: Evidence from China’s Land Market 
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More importantly, when learning from the Chinese experience, it is important 
to highlight that their current model of value capture will soon reach its limits. 
For example, there are policy experiments in Shenzhen that try to emulate 
Hong Kong’s so-called “Rail+Property” model.107 This model of transit-
oriented development allows for the capture of value from public investments 
in the transportation system. However, it is already facing challenges in its 
implementation in the Chinese context; for example, outside of Shenzhen, 
other local governments have found their real estate markets not to be vibrant 
enough to be willing to experiment with this model.108  There are a number of 
other value capture mechanisms that Chinese and African cities may want to 
concurrently explore, in order to avoid the challenges of relying solely on land-
based financing through expansion.
To supplement local government revenue, the Chinese government has 
been exploring the possibility of introducing a property tax. It has already 
experimented with this in Shanghai and Chongqing, but has not managed to 
scale it up nationally yet.109 This is one area where China could actually learn 
from the diverse experience with property tax across the African continent, as 
many countries have had a property tax for a number of years and are currently 
reforming their systems with positive results.110 For example, administrative 
reforms in Kampala, Uganda, resulted in increases in property tax collection by 
more than 100% in the space of four years.111 
One of the major questions for the Chinese government is the affordability 
of an introduced tax. In particular, there are fears that the introduction of 
property taxes could result in a large real estate sell-off, with dire financial 
implications for the national economy.112 Although the property markets in 
African cities differ from those in Chinese cities, African policymakers have 
been grappling with similar issues of ensuring affordability for taxpayers. Here, 
the introduction of the Land Use Charge (LUC) in Lagos provides an interesting 
example: in an effort to consolidate a number of prevailing taxes related 
to property, reforms were done to create one overarching tax, the LUC. To 
overcome resistance when it was initially introduced in 2001, the Lagos State 
Government initially set the rate relatively low and rather focused on ensuring 
it captured as many properties as possible in the tax base. They progressively 
107 Yang, J. 2019. “Value Capture Beyond Public Land-Leasing: Funding Rail Transit in 
China’s Pearl River Delta.”
108 Ibid.
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increased rates over time and coupled these with communications campaigns to 
highlight to the public what infrastructure and services property tax was paying 
for. Hence, this example also highlights how to communicate the importance 
of property tax and its link to service provision in order to ensure political 
buy-in. This could be especially important in the Chinese context as it will be a 
relatively new tax and thus likely to suffer resistance.113
Facilitating firm growth and investment 
The primary objective of urban policies should be to ensure that cities provide 
a favourable environment for economic growth and rising living standards. 
Effective land use and infrastructure policies are the fundamental building 
blocks needed for increased connectivity which allows cities to reap the benefits 
of scale and specialisation.114 Three types of connectivity matter the most for 
economic activity:
1 Between workers and firms.
2 Between households and sellers of locally-consumed goods.
3 Between producers and markets for internationally-traded goods.
Connectivity can be improved through two channels: density and transport. 
Policies that aim to increase productivity by improving connectivity are referred 
to as “spatial”, or “place-based” economic policies.115 These are distinguished 
from traditional, non-spatial policies used to improve productivity through 
other channels, such as tax exemptions or subsidised credit, for example.
Effective spatial policies have played a critical role in the economic success of 
China and today’s other middle- and high-income countries. The combination 
of urban density and transportation infrastructure, in particular, allowed 
the Chinese government to build highly connected cities, lowering the 
costs for firms and workers and simultaneously fostering urbanisation and 
industrialisation. Improved cost competitiveness in turn meant that firms in 
these cities had better prospects of competing in international markets, which 
offered further opportunities for their expansion and concomitant increases in 
productivity. 
As outlined in the section on governance, it is also important that local 
governments have capacity to plan and implement effective policies. A key 
feature of the Chinese institutional setting was that urban and economic 
planning were closely integrated and coordinated across government. This was 
underpinned by China’s huge population and large surplus of rural labour, 
which meant its urban and industrial growth strategy could capitalise on low-
cost migrant labour – often offering only partial access rights to the city in 
return. At the same time, planning processes were given scope to flexibly adapt 
113 Ibid (102).
114 This discussion draws on Collier (2016) (Ibid 3).
115 Duranton, Gilles, and Anthony J. Venables. Place-based policies for development. The 
World Bank, 2018.
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policies to short-term changes.116 This meant authorities could support firm 
growth by being responsive to their changing requirements.
Special Economic Zones (SEZs)
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) are one of the main spatial policies that can 
be used by governments as a tool for industrialisation. An SEZ is a delimited 
geographic area where bespoke infrastructure and a differential regulatory 
regime are used to attract certain kinds of investments. Whilst there is a long 
story of using economic enclaves for commercial purposes, the modern concept 
of SEZ arose in the post-war period, starting with the zone in Shannon, Ireland, 
in 1958.117 Export-processing zones (EPZs), a specific type of SEZ, were also 
an important part of the development experiences of many East and Southeast 
Asian countries before 1979.118 However, the wide use of SEZs took off in the 
1980s and 1990s, as increased capital mobility in the global economy, coupled 
with improvements in the transport and communications sectors, allowed firms 
from more developed countries to search for low-cost production sites around 
the world.119 
China was at the forefront of this trend in the world economy. The Chinese 
SEZ programme, initiated in 1979 and later greatly expanded, was the most 
iconic country experience with SEZs and has inspired the recent uptake of 
this policy tool as a means of promoting industrialisation in many developing 
countries. The emergence and success of the SEZ model in China owes in large 
part to the strengths of the Chinese policy process. In fact, all industrial zones 
had to address similar issues such as the provision of land and infrastructure, 
connectivity to a suitable workforce and to international markets, and how to 
cope with environmental issues.120 How this was done differed both across 
China and across time. Various combinations of spatial and non-spatial policies 
have come to characterise the different types of SEZs in China. This diversity 
also underscores the role of contextual factors in shaping the specific models 
of SEZ that are introduced. For example, the so-called “comprehensive SEZs” 
such as the original four in Shenzhen, Zhuahi, Shantou and Xiamen, and later 
versions in Hainan, Shanghai Pudong, and Tianjin Binhai, all included entire 
urban areas within the scope of a special regulatory regime. This facilitated the 
integration of urban and economic planning. However, other types of SEZs, 
such as economic and technological development zones (ETDZs) or high-tech 
116 Heilmann, Sebastian. "Making Plans for Markets: Policies for the Long Term in 
China'." Harvard Asia Quarterly 13, no. 2 (2011): 33-40.
117 Bach, Jonathan. "Shenzhen: From Exception to Rule." O’Donnell, Mary Ann, Winnie 
Wong, and Jonathan Bach, Learning from Shenzhen: China’s Post-Mao Experiment from 
Special Zone to Model City (2017): 23-37.
118 Naughton, Barry J. The Chinese economy: Adaptation and growth. Second Edition. 
MIT Press, 2018, p. 428.
119 See Baldwin, Richard. The great convergence. Harvard University Press, 2016. For the 
relationship between changes in the global economy and the Chinese SEZ experience, see 
Bach (2017). 
120 See for instance the contributions in Zeng, Douglas Zhihua, ed. Building engines 
for growth and competitiveness in China: Experience with special economic zones and 
industrial clusters. The World Bank, 2010.). 
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industrial development zones (HIDZs) did not share this feature and functioned 
with narrower remits as instruments of industrial policy. 
Unfortunately, there is still little evidence on how the relationship between 
urban policy and SEZ design influences overall success in stimulating economic 
activity. Shenzhen is certainly a classic example of urban planning contributing 
to industrialisation. However, it is important to remember that it was a small 
fishing town of barely 30,000 people before being appointed as an SEZ. This 
meant that it essentially offered a clean slate on which to experiment with 
planning efforts and might not be replicable in other SEZs across the world.121 
Even in China, Shenzhen’s success was not matched by that of the other 
comprehensive SEZs: while Shenzhen’s GDP grew at an average yearly rate 
of 58% between 1980 and 1984, Zhuhai grew at 32%, Xiamen at 13%, and 
Shantou at 9% on average, as compared to an average growth rate of about 
10% for China as a whole.122 For the period from 1980-1997, the average 
growth rates were 28% for Shenzhen, 18% for Zhuhai, 16% for Xiamen, and 
12% of Shantou.123 Although the other zones can by no means be considered 
failures, there is a clear shortfall in performance relative to Shenzhen in need of 
being explained.
Part of this shortfall has been attributed to the fact that Zhuhai and Shantou 
were “historic cities with strong local customs and culture, as well as their own 
languages”, which reduced the scope for radically innovative approaches such 
as those introduced in Shenzhen.124 More generally, the institutions implanted in 
other SEZs failed to achieve the same strength as in Shenzhen, since they were 
plagued by problems such as a lack of foreign investor interest, corruption, 
customs irregularities, overbuilt infrastructure, and real estate bubbles, owing to 
poor urban and zone management, which has been attributed to a lack of social 
trust, among other reasons.125 Chinese policymakers learnt from these initial 
shortcomings in SEZ design and when they inaugurated fourteen new ETDZs 
in 1984, they took measures to promote a more aggressive targeting of foreign 
investors, as well as to ensure that competition between ETDZs would compel 
authorities to optimise zone performance.126 Overall, however, not enough is 
known on why some SEZs succeeded in China and others failed. Learning from 
the failed Chinese SEZs would also be very instructive for African policymakers. 
Key lessons from the Chinese experience with relevance 
for African cities
Some African countries have started experimenting with the use of SEZs. 
However, most assessments of these SEZ programmes have been pessimistic, 
pointing to the low levels of investment, exports, and employment, as well as 
121 Ibid (84).
122 Ibid.
123 Knoth, Claus. "Special Economic Zones and Economic Transformation. The Case of the 
People's Republic of China." PhD diss., 2000, p. 154. 
124 Ibid (114: pp. 37-38).
125 See Ibid (84) and Ibid (114).
126 See Naughton, Barry J. The Chinese economy: Transitions and growth. 1st Edition MIT 
press, 2006, p. 409. 
While Shenzhen’s GDP 
grew at an average 
yearly rate of 58% 
between 1980 and 
1984, Zhuhai grew at 
32%, Xiamen at 13%, 
and Shantou at 9%.
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more systemic issues including poor design and misplaced political economy 
incentives.127 Interestingly, shortcomings in urban policy and management have 
so far received little attention when trying to explain African SEZs’ lack of 
success. Some recent evidence suggests that this might have been a mistake. For 
example, a recent quantitative study of the drivers of SEZ performance around 
the world finds that low-cost locations close to large cities and large markets 
lead to improvements in SEZ performance.128 This is further corroborated by 
the recent Ethiopian experience with SEZs, currently the most ambitious in Sub-
Saharan Africa, as outlined in Case Study 8. In view of these findings, learning 
from both the successes and challenges that China has faced in this area could 
be particularly instructive.129 
It should be highlighted that urban policies are only one subset of spatial 
policies, which can also be implemented at the regional or national levels.130 At 
each of these levels, the effective integration of spatial and economic planning 
plays a key role in shaping patterns of urbanisation and industrialisation. The 
same applies to infrastructure provision, which is crucial for enhancing an 
economy’s international competitiveness.131 In many African countries, however, 
these policy areas usually fall under the remit of different authorities and are 
therefore not tackled concurrently.132 Addressing this problem requires the 
input and coordination of activities across a variety of national government 
bodies, such as ministries of transport, trade, planning and others. Given the 
comprehensive nature of the Chinese planning process, exploring China’s 
experience could also be instructive for aligning the incentives of these different 
127 See Farole, Thomas. Special economic zones in Africa: comparing performance and 
learning from global experiences. The World Bank, 2011; and Farole, T., and Lotta 
Moberg. "Special Economic Zones in Africa, Political Economy Challenges and Solutions." 
Page, John and Finn Tarp. The Practice of Industrial Policy: Government-Business 
Coordination in Africa and East Asia (2017): 234-54.
128 Frick, Susanne A., Andrés Rodríguez-Pose, and Michael D. Wong. "Toward 
Economically Dynamic Special Economic Zones in Emerging Countries." Economic 
Geography 95, no. 1 (2019): 30-64.
129 For instance, when designing its industrial parks, the Ethiopian government 
commissioned a study on industrial park development, which focused mainly on China, but 
also looked at the experiences of Korea, Mauritius, Malaysia, and countries in the Middle 
East and North Africa. See Weldesilassie, Alebel Bayrau, Mulu Gebreeyesus, Girum Abebe, 
and Berihu Aseffa, “Study on Industrial Park Development: Issues, Practices and Lessons 
for Ethiopia”. Ethiopian Development Research Institute Research Report 29 (2017).. Few 
other African government have been equally methodical in drawing lessons from Asian 
countries’ experiences, but these have nonetheless served as inspiration. For the case of 
Kenya, see Fourie, Elsje. "Model students: Policy emulation, modernization, and Kenya's 
Vision 2030." African Affairs 113, no. 453 (2014): 540-562.
130 Ibid (108).
131 See, for example, the discussion on China’s central-government sponsored macro-
regional development plans in Heilmann, Sebastian, and Oliver Melton. "The reinvention of 
development planning in China, 1993–2012." Modern China 39, no. 6 (2013): 580-628.
132 See, for example, the case studies of SEZ development in Tanzania in Whitfield, Lindsay, 
Ole Therkildsen, Lars Buur, and Anne Mette Kjær. The politics of African industrial policy: 
A comparative perspective. Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 220-231. See also Farole 
(2011); and Zeng, Douglas Zhihua. Global experiences with special economic zones: focus 
on China and Africa. The World Bank, 2015.
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actors. More generally, it can shed light on the most appropriate institutional 
formulas for harnessing the potential contribution of local government to 
efficient urbanisation and industrialisation.
CASE STUDY 8: URBAN POLICY AND HAWASSA INDUSTRIAL 
PARK, ETHIOPIA
Hawassa Industrial Park (HIP), an SEZ, located in Ethiopia’s Southern 
Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ Republic (SNNPR) is the flagship 
project in a series of industrial parks built by the Ethiopian government. 
The aim is to create employment for its growing population and to 
address the country’s chronic lack of foreign exchange. The park has 
been able to successfully increase its employment to 30,000 workers, 
on the back of the successful attraction of foreign investors, including 
American apparel firm called PVH.133
Entrance to Hawassa Industrial Park
Source: Wikipedia 
However, it has been beset by a few problems that threaten its long-
term viability, mostly related to worker dissatisfaction with the wage 
levels, which vary between ETB 600-1200 (equivalent to roughly $20-$40 
per month). The limited purchasing power of these wages appears to be 
linked in part to poorly functioning urban policies. For example, many 
workers migrating from rural areas to Hawassa are confronted with a 
scarcity of affordable housing. This stems from a limited availability of 
land for development, partly due to the high costs and complexities of 
expropriating surrounding agricultural land; an unfavourable geography; 
and high costs of financing and construction. These difficulties are 
compounded by the local government’s lack of financial resources and 
capacity, which reduces the feasibility of solutions such as subsidised 
housing or dormitories.134
133 Ibid (121: Schmidt et al. (2018))
134 Grant, E., Desta, G., Admassie, Y., & Stevens, S.. Shelter issues and solutions in 
Hawassa. London: International Institute for Environment and Development. (2019)
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One of the consequences of the housing problem has been an increase 
in urban sprawl. Workers in HIP are having to resort to informal housing 
in peripheral parts of the city. Yet the lack of adequate transportation to 
take these workers to the park means that employers have to arrange 
transportation, which poses an additional cost to firms. These relatively 
high rent and transport prices observed in Hawassa impinge on the real 
wage of workers, in turn affecting the cost competitiveness of HIP as an 
investment location. Furthermore, in spite of its ambitious targets, HIP is 
yet to bring an influx of workers of comparable scale to those observed 
in Shenzhen and other Chinese SEZs. This has meant that the basic 
structure of the pre-existing urban area has mostly been preserved, so 
that authorities have had to contend with area’s pre-existing institutions 
and history of political and ethnic conflicts. As a result, they have not 
had free reign to radically restructure the urban environment to the 
same extent as observed in many Chinese SEZs.135 Dealing with the 
twin challenges of urbanisation and industrialisation in Hawassa is still 
a challenge, and further research is needed in order to devise suitable 
policy and institutional solutions.
Conclusion
This paper has traced the origins of Africa and China’s urbanisation stories 
and contextualised the similarities and differences between these two regions. 
It’s first important to note that the underpinning of the two regions’ urban 
transitions were vastly different. Although both have been in the context of 
rising urban incomes, structural transformation in China meant that there was 
the opportunity to shift from agriculture towards higher-productivity jobs in 
secondary and tertiary sectors in cities. African cities on the other hand, have 
been largely characterised by increasing consumption of non-tradable and 
small-scale services, which are not as productivity-enhancing job sectors.
Within these development patterns seen, four major themes emerge. The first 
theme pertains to the importance of planning urbanisation ahead of settlement: 
as African urbanisation was not coupled with the draw of manufacturing and 
service sectors in cities, it has been by its nature unexpected and unplanned. 
Governments have not yet harnessed urban land to support growth and this 
has been compounded by complexities surrounding many urban African land 
institutions. For example, the lack of clarity over who owns what land and 
under what legal basis in many African cities has dampened the vibrancy 
of real estate markets as well as the government’s capacity to manage how 
urbanisation takes place. This couples with the second theme relating to low 
investment in infrastructure. Governments have not had the capacity to invest 
135 See, for example, Mains, Daniel, and Eshetayehu Kinfu. "Making the city of nations 
and nationalities: the politics of ethnicity and roads in Hawassa, Ethiopia." The Journal of 
Modern African Studies 54, no. 4 (2016): 645-669.
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in the fundamental infrastructure and services which support urban growth, 
leading to costly and protracted challenges when trying to renew and rejuvenate 
areas of settlement that had previously seen limited investment. 
Such systems are often predicated on the strength of local government, the third 
theme, and in particular their ability to manage urbanisation through raising 
funds to invest in infrastructure and deliver services. Effective decentralisation 
has not yet been completed in many African countries. Furthermore, limitations 
in capacity tend to further exacerbate the challenges. This is often further 
limited by a lack of investment, coordination and provision of responsibility on 
imparted from the national government. 
All of these factors have contributed to a trend in African cities, exemplified 
by the fourth theme, of urbanisation taking place unaccompanied by 
industrialisation and structural transformation. Firms need access to quality 
infrastructure and labour, as well as, a supportive institutional environment, in 
order to be productive. The relative performance of SEZs in Africa versus China 
is an interesting manifestation of how these differences in urban infrastructure 
and institutional capacities translate to the ability for firms to operate 
effectively. 
These themes are key to understanding how the link between urbanisation 
and industrialisation was formed during China’s period of economic 
reform. However, we recognise that there are major differences between 
African countries and China which may limit the applicability of the 
Chinese experience. While many look to Chinese cities and see the successes, 
urbanisation has not come without its failures, including environmental 
degradation, the limits of land-based financing, and increasing worries about 
the collapse of the housing market, among others. 
By exploring these key themes in further research and through comparing and 
contrasting the urbanisation stories of China and Africa, we may come closer 
to finding adaptable approaches with the potential to improve outcomes in 
urban Africa. This will require understanding where African cities can adapt 
and build on China’s successes, whilst proactively trying to avoid and mitigate 
its challenges. Further work in this area could also highlight areas where China 
may want to learn from African cities; one such area illustrated in this paper is 
in the implementation of a property tax system.
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